descartes’ reason discourse(笛卡尔的推理)
sufficient to assure us）； custom has without doubt materially smoothed
their inconveniences； and has even managed to steer altogether clear of； or
insensibly corrected a number which sagacity could not have provided
against with equal effect； and； in fine； the defects are almost always more
tolerable than the change necessary for their removal； in the same manner
that highways which wind among mountains； by being much frequented；
bee gradually so smooth and modious； that it is much better to
follow them than to seek a straighter path by climbing over the tops of
rocks and descending to the bottoms of precipices。
Hence it is that I cannot in any degree approve of those restless and
busy meddlers who； called neither by birth nor fortune to take part in the
management of public affairs； are yet always projecting reforms； and if I
thought that this tract contained aught which might justify the suspicion
that I was a victim of such folly； I would by no means permit its
publication。 I have never contemplated anything higher than the
reformation of my own opinions； and basing them on a foundation wholly
my own。 And although my own satisfaction with my work has led me to
present here a draft of it； I do not by any means therefore remend to
every one else to make a similar attempt。 Those whom God has endowed
with a larger measure of genius will entertain； perhaps； designs still more
exalted； but for the many I am much afraid lest even the present
11
… Page 12…
DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON； AND
SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES
undertaking be more than they can safely venture to imitate。 The single
design to strip one’s self of all past beliefs is one that ought not to be taken
by every one。 The majority of men is posed of two classes； for neither
of which would this be at all a befitting resolution： in the first place； of
those who with more than a due confidence in their own powers； are
precipitate in their judgments and want the patience requisite for orderly
and circumspect thinking； whence it happens； that if men of this class once
take the liberty to doubt of their accustomed opinions； and quit the beaten
highway； they will never be able to thread the byway that would lead them
by a shorter course； and will lose themselves and continue to wander for
life； in the second place； of those who； possessed of sufficient sense or
modesty to determine that there are others who excel them in the power of
discriminating between truth and error； and by whom they may be
instructed； ought rather to content themselves with the opinions of such
than trust for more correct to their own reason。
For my own part； I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class；
had I received instruction from but one master； or had I never known the
diversities of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed among
men of the greatest learning。 But I had bee aware； even so early as
during my college life； that no opinion； however absurd and incredible；
can be imagined； which has not been maintained by some on of the
philosophers； and afterwards in the course of my travels I remarked that
all those whose opinions are decidedly repugnant to ours are not in that
account barbarians and savages； but on the contrary that many of these
nations make an equally good； if not better； use of their reason than we do。
I took into account also the very different character which a person
brought up from infancy in France or Germany exhibits； from that which；
with the same mind originally； this individual would have possessed had
he lived always among the Chinese or with savages； and the circumstance
that in dress itself the fashion which pleased us ten years ago； and which
may again； perhaps； be received into favor before ten years have gone；
appears to us at this moment extravagant and ridiculous。 I was thus led
to infer that the ground of our opinions is far more custom and example
than any certain knowledge。 And； finally； although such be the ground of
12
… Page 13…
DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON； AND
SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES
our opinions； I remarked that a plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of
truth where it is at all of difficult discovery； as in such cases it is much
more likely that it will be found by one than by many。 I could； however；
select from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of
preference； and thus I found myself constrained； as it were； to use my own
reason in the conduct of my life。
But like one walking alone and in the dark； I resolved to proceed so
slowly and with such circumspection； that if I did not advance far； I would
at least guard against falling。 I did not even choose to dismiss summarily
any of the opinions that had crept into my belief without having been
introduced by reason； but first of all took sufficient time carefully to
satisfy myself of the general nature of the task I was setting myself； and
ascertain the true method by which to arrive at the knowledge of whatever
lay within the pass of my powers。
Among the branches of philosophy； I had； at an earlier period； given
some attention to logic； and among those of the mathematics to
geometrical analysis and algebra； three arts or sciences which ought； as I
conceived； to contribute something to my design。 But； on examination； I
found that； as for logic； its syllogisms and the majority of its other
precepts are of avail… rather in the munication of what we already
know； or even as the art of Lully； in speaking without judgment of things
of which we are ignorant； than in the investigation of the unknown； and
although this science contains indeed a number of correct and very
excellent precepts； there are； nevertheless； so many others； and these either
injurious or superfluous； mingled with the former； that it is almost quite as
difficult to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a
Diana or a Minerva from a rough block of marble。 Then as to the analysis
of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns； besides that they embrace
only matters highly abstract； and； to appearance； of no use； the former is
so exclusively restricted to the consideration of figures； that it can exercise
the understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the imagination；
and； in the latter； there is so plete a subjection to certain rules and
formulas； that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity
calculated to embarrass； instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind。
13
… Page 14…
DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON； AND
SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES
By these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which
would prise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their
defects。 And as a multitude of laws often only hampers justice； so that a
state is best governed when； with few laws； these are rigidly administered；
in like manner； instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is
posed； I believed that the four following would prove perfectly
sufficient for me； provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution
never in a single instance to fail in observing them。
The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly
know to be such； that is to say； carefully to avoid precipitancy and
prejudice； and to prise nothing more in my judgement than what was
presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of
doubt。
The second； to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as
many parts as possible； and as might be necessary for its adequate
soluti